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MUNICIPAL MOTOR VEHICLE REGULATIONS IN THE PRESENCE
OF GENERAL STATUTES [OHIO]
The recently released case of Russo v.
State* again poses the complex question
of the extent of police power properly to
be allowed to cities in the regulation of
motor vehicles and their operation within
the corporate limits of a city when the
matter is also dealt with by general state
law. Ignatius Russo was convicted of con-
tributing to the delinquency of his 17-
year-old stepson, in that he permitted him
to operate an automobile in the city of
Cleveland, contrary to an ordinance which
prohibited any person under the age of
18 years from driving. The State Drivers'
License Law permitting the licensing of
persons under 18 after examination. The
boy had secured such a state license, and
the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeal de-
clared the stricter ordinance was uncon-
stitutional, as not authorized by Article
18, sec. 3, of the Ohio constitution, em-
powering charter cities to adopt such
police regulations as are not in conflict
with general laws of the state. Russo's
conviction was reversed and he was dis-
charged.
The importance of municipal regulation
of motor vehicles is obvious, and it is pro-
posed herein to examine the legal status
of such regulation, with particular em-
phasis upon that type of regulation which
is in conflict with state legislation.
The conception of municipal corpora-
tions as mere administrative areas of the
states has been consistently maintained
by the federal courts; but "state courts
recognize a dual capacity in municipal
* (Ohio App., 1938), 31 N. E. (2d) 102; appeal
dismissed, 134 Ohio St. 510, 17 N. E. (2d) 915
(1938).
1 Walker, Federal Limitations upon Municipal
corporations: (1) to act as agents of the
state in carrying on state functions within
their territorial jurisdiction, and (2) to
act as an agency for the satisfaction of
local needs."'
As to the appropriate scope of the or-
dinance-making power, Dillon's summary,
first enunciated in 1872, is still the ac-
cepted delimitation: "It is a general and
undisputed proposition of law that a muni-
cipal corporation possesses and can ex-
ercise the following powers and no others;
first, those granted in express words;
second, those necessarily or fairly implied
in or incident to the powers expressly
granted; third, those essential to the ac-
complishment of the dclared objects and
purposes of the corporation-not simply
convenient, but indispensable. Any fair,
reasonable, substantial doubt concerning
the exercise of power is resolved by the
courts against the corporation and the
power is denied."2
As cities have grown, greater demands
are laid upon the governmental authori-
ties for affirmative action in the "accom-
plishment of the declared objects and pur-
poses of the corporation," one of which,
no state court would deny, is the protec-
tion of its populace from reckless, unsafe,
or indiscreet use of the public ways by
motor vehicles. In this direction, a more
aggressively independent concept of the
city's police powers might be preferred.
As Freund wrote: "The principle of dele-
gation seems to be to make the municipal
police power co-extensive with local dan-
Ordinance Making Power (1929) 6.
2 1 Dillon, Commentaries on the Law of Mu-
nicipal Corporations (5th ed., 1911) 237.
[81]
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gers arising from the close aggregation
and contact of persons and property in
a limited space or territory.
'3
Some writers, definitely in the minority,
have maintained that such powers of local
self-government are independent of the
precise charter and legislative limits set
up in each state; McQuillin contends that
local self-government does not owe its
existence to the constitution and laws of
the state at all, but that it existed before
them.4 McBain further advocates the ex-
tension of the federal principle into the
realm of state-city relations: "Mere con-
gestion of people creates problems that
are peculiar to the city itself. To a very
considerable extent, therefore, it is a nat-
ural economic and sociological unit. As
such it is a perfectly logical governmental
unit."5
Some support to this approach is found
in a few decisions which allow indepen-
dent police powers to cities when there is
no general legislation in force concern-
ing the particular subject-matter. A
local regulation in Ohio limiting the hours
of work on public projects was allowed
full force until the statute on the same
subject became effective.6 And in the field
of motor vehicle regulation, an ordinance
fixing a definite rate of speed where the
statutory rate was indefinite was sustained,
the Missouri Supreme Court remarking:
"Before we hold that the police power has
been withdrawn from these municipalities
of the state, the legislative language will
have to be . . . explicit."'7 Local speed
regulations would naturally be of con-
siderable moment in those states which
have no statutory scale of prima facie un-
reasonable speeds, but rely on a gener-
ally-worded basic rule."
With regard to drivers' licenses, the
particular problem of the principal case,
3 Freund, The Police Power (1904) §140, at 131.
4 1 Municipal Corporations (2d ed., 1940) §268.
5 The Law and Practice of Municipal Home
Rule (1916) 110.
6 Stange v. City of Cleveland, 94 Ohio St. 377,
114 N. E. 261 (1916).
7 Roper v. Greenspon. 272 Mo. 288, 198 S. W.
1107 (1917).
8 Conn. Gen. Stats. (1930) §1582; Mont. Rev.
Codes (1935) §1742; Nev. Comp. Laws (1938
Supp.) §4350; Texas Penal Code (Vernon, 1936),
art. 790.
9 International Motor Transit Co. v. City of
Seattle, 141 Wash. 194. 251 Pac. 120 (1926).
there is not the unanimity of decision
which would seem to flow from the
general rule that all municipal legislation
must conform to the general statutes.
This is particularly significant in the light
of the problem involved-licensing is
much more apparently a state-wide issue
than is the speed and direction of traffic.
When the state does not provide for a
drivers' license, local authorities have
been allowed to institute such a require-
ment, at least in Washington 9 and South
Carolina."
Where ordinances are stricter in their
terms than the general state law, as in
the principal case, it is at once obvious
that the "fundamental" requirement of
conformity with general statutes or specific
charter authority prevails to render void
and of no effect most ordinances repugnant
thereto. An ordinance in Virginia which
did not grant the right to drive by special
permit to persons under 16 years of age,
as provided in the general statute, was
held of no effect in a suit on an insur-
ance policy;" a Florida statute providing
that license fees stipulated therein should
be in place of any county or local fees
was held to render a municipal license fee
invalid. 12 Previous municipal authority to
tax motor vehicles may be withdrawn by
a later statute, whether the power was
derived from charter' or statute.14
However, in South Carolina, even after
a general statute had been passed direct-
ing a state department to license drivers.
with a minimum age limit of 12 years, a
Charleston city ordinance, restricting the
issuance of licenses to persons over 16,
was held valid as a proper exercise of
municipal police power."" The Supreme
Court of the United States allowed an
ordinance similar to that of Cleveland in
the principal case to be admitted in evi-
10 State v. Perry. 138 S. C. 329. 136.S. E. 314
(1927).
11 Hannabass v. Maryland Casualty Co., 169
Va. 559. 194 S. E. 808 (1938); cf. also Loewenberg
v. Fidelity Union Casualty Co. (La. App.), 147
So. 81 (1933).
12 Anderson v. Wentworth. 75 Fla. 300, 78 So.
265 (1918).
13 Ex parte Shaw, 53 Okla. 654, 157 Pac. 900
(1916).
14 City of Buffalo v. Lewis, 192 N. Y. 193, 84
N. E. 809 (1908).
15 State (City of Charleston) v. Moseley, 174
S. C. 187, 177 S. E. 156 (1934).
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dence in an action on an insurance policy,
although it set a minimum driver's age of
18 years, while the Ohio statute set one
of 16 years. 6
With regard to the reasonable regula--
tion of moving traffic, a vitally important
problem in large cities and in small ones
located on important traffic channels, the
conflict of authorities is sharp and fairly
evenly balanced. A long series of deci-
sions follow the general rule, and hold
that where the legislature has enacted a
"state traffic code," any type of overlap-
ping municipal regulation is ineffective.17
The reasoning of the courts in these cases
is typified. by the California Supreme
Court: "Whenever the State . . . sees
fit to adopt a general scheme for the reg-
ulation and control of motor vehicles upon
the highways of the state, the entire con-
trol over whatever phases of the subject
are covered by state legislation ceases in
so far as municipal or local legislation is
concerned."18 In one case a municipal
regulation prescribing a full stop for
vehicles approaching certain named streets
was held inconsistent with a statute pre-
scribing the speed with which vehicles
should approach "intersecting high-
ways";' 9 thus was denied all power of
the city to manage the type of hazardous
situation which develops in all congested
areas.
Although the Ohio case of Schneider-
man v. Sesanstein2" adheres to the usual
rule, its dissenting opinion is a forceful
exposition of the theory upon which the
courts might hold such ordinances valid.
A plaintiff in a personal-injury suit relied
upon an ordinance of the city of Akron
requiring automobile drivers to slow down
to fifteen miles per hour in passing school
buildings during certain hours of the day.
',U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Guenther,
281 U. S. 34. 50 S. Ct. 165, 72 A.L.R. 1064 (1930).
v; Ex parte Smith, 26 Cal. App. 116, 146 Pac. 82
(1914); Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 192 Pac.
442, 21 A. L. R. 1172 (1920); Chicago v. Kluever,
257 Ill. 317, 109 N. E. 917 (1913); Hoosier Mfg.
Co. v. Berry, 197 Ind. 368, 149 N. E. 723 (1925);
Town of Randolph v. Gee, 199 Iowa 181, 201
N. W. 567 (1925); Commonwealth v. Newhall,
205 Mass. 344, 91 N. E. 206 (1910); Kenney v.
Hoerr, 324 Mo. 368, 23 S. W. (2d) 96 (1929);
People v. Braun, 166 N. Y. S. 708 (1917); Ex
parte Wright, 82 Tex. Crim. R. 247. 199 S. W. 486
(1917); State v. Charleston, 92 W. Va. 61, 114 S. E.
The evidence thus proferred was excluded
on trial, because the applicable statute
allowed a speed of twenty miles per hour
under like circumstances. In upholding
the trial court, the majority of the
Supreme Court relied on the California
decisions, especially Ex parte Daniels,2' to
the effect that the general state law
assures the driver that he may drive up
to a certain speed with confidence that it
is lawful, and that the law applies uni-
formly throughout the state; therefore, if
a city makes more rigid requirements, it
deprives the citizens of the state of their
generally granted rights and privileges.
Noting the decision in City of Fremont v.
Keating22 as still good law, the court dis-
tinguished the cases on the basis that the
local ordinance is valid only so long as
it does not conflict with "general law,"
and that the Akron ordinance did so con-
flict, while the Fremont ordinance, being
largely repetitious of the statute, did not.
This is also the reasoning followed in the
principal case.
In vigorously dissenting, Judge Allen
maintained that the ordinance did not
necessarily conflict with the "general law,"
and that the decision of the majority ran
counter to the weight of authority and
better policy. "Long prior to the enact-
ment of the home rule amendment, the
right to regulate traffic on city streets was
recognized as constituting a peculiar
power of local self-government. That the
power here in question is exercised only
within the confines of the municipality is
self-evident, and to that extent it is mani-
festly local. . . . The municipality knows
the conditions and the needs of its own
traffic better than any state legislature
however intelligent. . . . Because of the
very nature of the problem, recognized for
382 (1922); Oshkosh v. Campbell, 151 Wis. 567,
139 N. W. 316 (1913); Stewart v. Olson, 188 Wis.
487, 206 N. W. 909 (1926).
IsAtlas Mixed Mortar Co. v. Burbank, 202
Cal. 660, 262 Pac. 334, at 336 (1927).
'9 State v. Stallings, 189 N. C. 104, 126 S. E.
187 (1925).
20 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N. E. 158 (1929).
21 183 Cal. 636, 192 Pac. 442 (1920).
22 96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N. E. 114 (1917), holding
unconstitutional a statute prohibiting cities from
regulating the speed of motor vehicles, in that
the statute violated the municipal police-power
provision of the constitution.
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generations as being a purely local ques-
tion, in my judgment the regulation of
traffic on the streets of a city comes within
the power of local self-government and
is not, and cannot be, limited by general
law."
As far as police power generally is con-
cerned, the home rule cities of Ohio may
be considered to stand on equal footing
with other cities.23 Under the reasoning
of Judge Allen, therefore, can there be
discerned a realm of municipal police
power in respect to which a city may
effectively set aside statutory regulations?
In two cases24 the Ohio Supreme Court
had given some support to this view in
upholding ordinances regarding traffic on
the basis that the city's regulation of the
streets is a purely local problem, and that
state traffic laws are apparently not "gen-
eral laws" in the meaning of the con-
stitution, the term properly being re-
stricted to police and sanitary regulations
which affect all the people of the state in
an inclusive sense. But in the later case
of Bucyrus v. State Department of
Health,2 5 and in the Sesanstein" case, the
court rather abandons this view, consid-
ering that the state's power to enact police
legislation was as broad after the enact-
ment of the police-power reservation in
the constitution as it had been previously,
the emphasis being "placed on 'general' in
the sense of 'uniform'. '' 7
But if the ordinances are regarded in
the sense of additional or supplementary
to the statute, there is less difficulty in
holding them valid; "each may be directed
against a different evil or danger. Thus a
state license for peddling does not con-
template the occupation of a street for
a temporary stand from which to sell
goods, and this may be prohibited not-
withstanding the state license."sS
Even in Ohio this principle has been
recognized, as where the city of Piqua
required a full stop in certain situations
2- McGoldrick. Law and Practice of Municipal
Home Rule 1916-1930 (1933) 332,
24 Froelich v. City of Cleveland. 99 Ohio St.
376, 124 N. E. 212 (1919); Lorain Street Railroad
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 113 Ohio St.
68, 148 N. E. 577 (1925).
25 120 Ohio St. 426. 166 N. E. 370 (1929).
2-; 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N. E. 158 (1929).
27 McGoldrick, op. cit. supra note 23. at 221.
-"the city had a right to adopt additional
regulations, and the requirement to stop
is not questioned as a valid exercise of the
police power."2 - In Nebraska, a state
traffic code designed to be "exclusive" did
not prevent "further restrictions" by cities
if reasonable and made necessary by
special conditions plainly not considered
by the legislature and which did not pro-
hibit the free use of the streets.2 0 And in
Minnesota, even where the statute for-
bade local speed regulations, or any regu-
lations relating to the "use or speed of
motor vehicles," a city wheel tax was
upheld.' "
It thus appears that there is no insur-
mountable difficulty in upholding traffic
ordinances even where they impose
stricter duties than do the state laws, if
the state courts assume a liberal inter-
pretation of what constitutes a "general"
law and what should be the appropriate
scope of local police power. The justifica-
tion of strict uniformity throughout the
state is of course the divergent character
of municipal regulations as to motor
traffic, making it difficult for the motorist
to know the law. But there is strong
reason for greater liberality, as already
indicated, and if sufficiently clear general
provisions are laid down in the general
traffic code, local problems may safely and
better be left to the cities, with appro-
priate standards of legislation laid down. "2
It has been demonstrated that the reduc-
tion of traffic accidents is achieved by
intelligent "selective enforcement" direct-
ed at the locus of the special hazards.
Standards of conduct for the drivers of a
state will best be determined by the law-
making bodies most familiar with the local
problems, aided by a modern state-wide
code. The net result of the two co-opera-
tive lines of regulation will be the holding
of motorists at all times to the standard
of conduct most conducive to general
safety on the highways.
THOMAS A. LEARY.
28 Freund, op. cit. supra note 3, at 145.
2 qHeidle v. Baldwin, 118 Ohio St. 375, 161 N. E.
44. 58 A. L. R. 1186 (1928).
'0 Christensen v. Tate, 87 Neb. 848, 128 N. W.
622 (1910).
U' Park v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 296, 159
N. W. 627 (1916).
2 Cf. Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on High-
ways (1939), especially §58.
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ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED'S PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
INTO EVIDENCE [TEXAS]
In Rains v. State,' a murder case, the
defendant testified that he shot the de-
ceased in self defense. To substantiate
this plea, he displayed a knife which he
claimed belonged to the deceased and that
he picked it up after the deceased had
fallen. The State, then, offered the testi-
mony of some of the grand jurors that the
defendant was asked during the grand
jury investigation whether he had seen any
weapon near the deceased at the time of
the killing and that the defendant an-
swered that he had not. Thereupon the
defendant offered to rebut this impeaching
evidence by showing by one Orr that he,
the defendant, stated the morning after
the homicide that he had picked up a knife
near the deceased and would show it to
the witness sometime. The trial court re-
fused to allow into evidence this proffered
testimony and found the defendant guilty
of murder.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
upheld the ruling of the trial court by
affirming the judgment. It held that since
the defendant had made the statement to
the witness Orr subsequent to his being
charged with the murder he had a "motive
to fabricate"; that witnesses may not rebut
impeaching evidence of contradictory
statements by evidence of other consistent
statements when such consistent state-
ments were made after such a motive
existed. There was, however, a vigorous
dissent by Judge Graves who attacked the
majority by contending, first, that the
Texas court, in previous cases, 2 had
allowed the introduction of testimony
1 146 S. W. (2d) 176 (Tex. Ct. of Crirn. App.
1941).
2 Hudson v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. 24, 90 S. W.
177 (1905); Campbell v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. 163,
32 S. W. 774 (1895).
349 Tex. Crim. 24, 90 S. W. 177 (1895).
478 Tex. Crim. 177, 180 S. W. 268 (1915). The
court did not allow the defendant, after he was
impeached, to introduce prior consistent state-
ments when the statements were made after he
was already charged with the crime. In dis-
cussing the Hudson case the court said, "It has
always been the rule in this State that when the
state seeks to impeach the witness by proof of
when there were similar "motives to
fabricate"; and second, that a line of de-
marcation could not properly be. made
between the non-existence of a motive to
fabricate before a person was charged
with the crime, and the existence of such
a motive after the charge. He argued that
any motive arose immediately after the
offense was committed.
The defendant, in the present case, pre-
sented as an authority for the introduc-
tion of the disputed testimony, State v.
Hudson 3 in which case the court allowed
the defendant in a rape case to offer evi-
dence that he had said at the grand jury
investigation that he was fourteen after
the arresting officers had testified he told
them he was sixteen. The present court,
non-commital as to whether or not the
decision in the Hudson case was based
upon the lack of motive to fabricate, dis-
missed its importance in summary fashion
by showing that the 'court in State v.
Blackburn4 (where the defendant had
relied bn the Hudson case) and in other
cases followed the rule used in the present
case. 5 It must be assumed, therefore, that
the present court is of the opinion, be-
cause of the decisions of these later cases
supporting the motive rule, that the court
in the Hudson case considered that no
motive existed. In State v. Campbell,6 an
earlier analogous case, the court, after an
attempt to impeach the defendant, allowed
into evidence a consistent statement of
the accused made after he had been
arrested for the crime. There is nothing
in the Texas decisions overruling this
contradictory statements, he may support his
testimony by showng that he had made similar
statements to that he testified on triaL" The
court further stated that, "it is not made to
appear that it was after Hudson had been
charged-with an offense that he made the state-
ment held to be admissible, and if it did so
appear, it would not be in harmony with a long
list of authorities in the state."
Anderson v. State, 50 Tex. Crim. 136, 95 S.
W. 1037 (1906); Ballow v. State, 42 Tex. Crim.
263. 58 S. W. 1023 (1900); Porter v. State, 50 S.
W. 380 (1899); Conway v. State, 33 Tex. Crim.
330. 26 S. W. 401 (1894).
6 35 Tex. Crim. 163, 32 S. W. 774 (1895).
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case. It is clear, however, from the later
decisions, that it is now following the rule
that one may not show substantiating
statements made by the accused after he
is charged with the crime.7 Yet unless the
prior inconsistent cases are expressly
repudiated, needless appeals will be made
at great expense to the parties involved.
Apart from the difficulty that has arisen
on the application of the rule further
difficulties exist which strike directly at
the merits of the rule itself. The first, as
pointed out by the dissent in the present
case, is the arbitrary drawing of a line
determining where the "motive to fabri-
cate" exists. This arbitrariness is well
exemplified by the Texas courts which
now invariably hold that after being
charged with the crime the defendant has
a motive to fabilcate. It is true that with
the existence of a "motive to fabricate"
rule in the law a line must be drawn as
to when the motive begins. It seems ques-
tionable whether the line should be def-
initely set or made into an axiom when
it is obvious that the criminal does not
wait until he has been charged with the
crime before he begins to cover up but
does so as soon as the crime is committed
or as soon as he first plans its commission.
To follow the consequences of the
majority Texas holding-that the accused
should not be allowed to show possible
fabricated alibi statements-to its ultimate
conclusion would result in denying the
accused all opportunity to rebut the im-
peaching testimony of former contradic-
tory statements by former consistent ones.
By doing this, one rule of evidence would
exist for the witnesses and a separate,
Cf. 7 Ency. of Evidence 286.
S The rule followed by most states is narrower
than that followed in Texas. It is that, gen-
erally, evidence of prior consistent statements
cannot be shown to rebut evidence of contra-
dictory statements; but that prior consistent
statements, clearly made before there was any
"motive to fabricate," may be allowed when it
is contended that the statements made on the
stand have been fabricated. Underhill, Criminal
Evidence (4th. ed. 1935) §429; 22 C. J. S. 1288§752; 70 Corp. Jur. 1185 §1369. This rule seem-
ingly does not discriminate against the accused
as does the Texas rule.
9 Although both the majority and dissent opin-
ions cite several Texas cases for the general
proposition that a witness may show prior con-
more severe one, for the accused.8 The
State would be given a seemingly unfair
advantage. Even if all accused persons
were held to have a motive to fabricate
from the very beginning the line would
still be arbitrarily drawn for certainly all
witnesses, except the casual bystanders,
have such an interest in the outcome of
a case, one way or the other, that they
have a tendency to flavor, and in some
instances perjure their testimony in line
with their interests.
Apparently both the majority and the
dissent in the present case have not appre-
ciated the distinction being made between
the accused and other witnesses for they
speak of a "motive to fabricate" and then
give supporting cases concerning the im-
peachment of witnesses because of prior
inconsistent statementsY No distinction
has been made between cases where a
defendant is a witness for himself or
where he is trying to introduce his own
statements through another witness and
cases where a witness gives testimony as
a bystander.
Finally, it is difficult to see how there
can be any reconciliation between the rule
that presumes a man is guilty and has a
motive to fabricate and the time-honored
theory of our democratic government that
a man is not guilty of a crime unless he
is convicted thereof. In discussing this
difficulty, Professor Wigmore pointedly
remarks that "we maintain with senti-
mental excess the privilege against self-
crimination; in short, we exhaust the re-
sources of reasoning and strain the com-
mon sense to protect an accused person
against an assumption until the proof is
sistent statements -to rebut impeaching contra-
dictory ones attributed to him, only Hudson v.
State, 49 Tex. Crim. 24, 90 S. W. 177 (1905);
Streight v. State, 62 Tex. Crim. 453, 138 S. W.
742 (1911); Ballow v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. 263, 58
S. W. 1023 (1900); and, Campbell v. State, 35 Tex.
Crim. 163, 32 S. W. 774 (1895) deal with state-
ments of the accused. The only Texas cases
cited, other than those dealing with statements
of accused persons, holding that prior consistent
statements will not be allowed because of a
"motive to fabricate" are those where the prior
consistent statements are those of accomplices
made after they have turned State's witness.
See Anderson v. State, 50 Tex. Crim. 136, 95
S. W. 1037 (1906); Conway v. State, 33 Tex.
Crim. 330, 26 S. W. 401 (1894).
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irresistible, and yet, at the present point
we throw these fixed principles to the
winds."10
There can be only one remedy to alle-
viate these difficulties of the rule, and that
is, of course, the obvious--do away with
the rule. Dispensing with the rule and
allowing the introduction of all prior con-
sistent statements will by no means lead
to chaos in our judicial system. It will be
a relatively easy matter to allow every
statement of the accused into evidence,
whether tainted or not with the "motive
to fabricate," and let the jury decide just
how much weight to give the statement.
By giving the testimony to the jury with
the necessary instructions to guide them
as to its weight, courts will be relieved of
(1) the confusion that has arisen because
of the failure to distinguish between the
impeachment of a defendant because of a
self-serving statement and the impeach-
ment of a witness because of prior in-
consistent statements; (2) the difficulty of
drawing a line as to when the "motive to
fabricate" exists, and (3) the evil of indi-




lo Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §1732.
RIGHT TO APPEAL BY THE STATE [ILLINOIS]*
In a recent Illinois case, a judge of the
Criminal Court of Cook County was in-
dicted for conspiracy. The indictment
charged that he had certified that certain
bail bonds containing schedules of personal
property had been sworn to before him,
as judge, when in fact no such acknowl-
edgement or proof was made by the per-
son who was surety in the bail bonds,
either before him or any other judge. The
defendant entered a plea in bar in which
he alleged that the constitution of Illinois'
prohibits criminal prosecution of judges
except by action of the legislature. The
plea was upheld by the trial court and the
cause was dismissed.2 The State's Attor-
ney, on behalf of the State, sued out a
writ of error, based on a Statute providing
for a review on behalf of the state from
"any order or judgment quashing or set-
ting aside an indictment or information."
3
The Appellate Court, in effect, sustained
the decision of the trial court by saying
that the State does not have the right to
appeal by writ of error where a plea in
bar has been sustained but only in those
cases setting aside or quashing an indict-
ment as provided in the statute.4 The
Court refused to pass upon the merits of
* State v. McGarry, 306 Ill. App. 542, 29 N. E.
(2d) 303 (1940).
1 Art. 6, Sec. 30-Il. Const. (1870).
2 People v. McGarry, Criminal Ct., Cook Cty.,
Ill., Nov. 21, 1940.
the plea in bar but dismissed the writ of
error for want of jurisdiction.
In its decision the Appellate Court re-
viewed the decisions of the Illinois Su-
preme Court in People. v. Vitale,5 People
v. White,, and People v. Finkelstein,- all
decided under this statute which allows
review on behalf of the State from the
quashing or setting aside of an indictment.
In the Vitale case the Court held that the
discharge of defendants on the sustaining
of a plea of autrefois convict did not give
the State a right to review under the
statute. In People v. White, where the
trial court sustained a plea of autrefois
acquit and further ordered the indictment
quashed although there was no motion to
quash, the Supreme Court held that the
State had no right to review and the addi-
tional sentence quashing the indictment
after the plea had been sustained should
be rejected as surplusage. In People v.
Finkelstein the Court held that the State
had a right to appeal where a motion to
quash was sustained but not where a plea
of immunity was sustained and that the
trial court could not give the State the
right of review by sustaining a motion to
quash which had been superseded, and
so waived, by a plea of immunity.
3 Smith-Hurd Ann. St. (1939), Ch. 38, Sec. 747.
4 306 IL App. 542, 29 N. E. (2d) 303 (1940).
5 364 IMl. 589, 5 N. E. (2d) 474 (1936).
G 364 II1. 574. 5 N. E. (2d) 472 (1936).
- 372 I1. 186, 23 N. E. (2d) 34 (1939).
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At common law, a special plea in bar
set up facts extrinsic to the indictment;
traditionally it was available in only four
instances-former acquittal, former con-
viction, former attainder, and pardon.3
On the other hand, the motion to quash
has always been the proper way of object-
ing to the indictment for insufficiency on
its face or on the face of the record, in
point of law, from whatever cause the
insufficiency aroseY It is submitted that
the plea in the instant case did not satisfy
the requirements of a special plea in bar
but merely questions the sufficiency of the
indictment, which should be raised by a
motion to quash.
What a party calls his pleading is not
essential. It is the substance that matters.
Here it is plain that the answer, to be
proper had to be a motion to quash the
indictment or set it aside, as has been
shown. Therefore, although the defendant
called it a plea in bar, it actually more
closely resembled a motion to quash. As
stated in the McGarry case, the right to
appeal by writ of error will lie only if
conferred by statute expressly and is
limited to the specific wording. Under the
interpretation here given, the writ of
error would lie in this case and it could
be reviewed on the merits. But, on the
basis of the prior decisions, it is very un-
likely that a writ of error will be allowed
by the Supreme Court of Illinois in this
case.' 0
In Illinois, at common law, the State
had no right to any review in criminal
proceedings." When the legislature saw
fit to enact legislation on this problem, it
followed the general practice of the time
84 Blackstone's Commentaries *335.
9Clark, Criminal Procedure (1895), Chap. 11.
10 Although the statute includes the words "or
setting aside," the Illinois courts have not given
them any added significance. It would appear
that the legislature had a definite purpose-in
adding those words. It could be validly argued
that these words apply in just such a situation
as in the instant case, but in People v. Vitale,
364 Ill. 589, 5 N. E. (2d) 474 (1936), the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the words "quashed"
and "setting aside" are synonomous in this
statute.
I People v. Dill, 2 Ill. 257; People v. Royal,
2 Ill. 557.
12 Smith-Hurd Ann. St. (1931), Ch. 38, See. 747.
13 See compilation of statutes in Amer. Law
and, in 1845, enacted a statute allowing
no appeal of any kind from any order,
decision, or judgment.' 2 While the legis-
lature may have enacted a statute agree-
ing with the general practice in other
states in 1845, it has taken a long time to
break from the theory. In the meantime
many states have adopted legislation
enabling the State in criminal cases to
appeal from any decision, order, or judg-
ment of the lower court; other states have
adopted legislation similar to that of
Illinois as it now stands.' 3
The present provision was enacted in
1933 and the Illinois courts have construed
this attempt to give the State a chance to
appeal very strictly against the State.14
And the Illinois Supreme Court, appar-
ently keeping in mind the double jeopardy
provision in the state constitution, 5 has
limited the statute to its exact wording; 16
thus while many states have liberalized
similar provisions, Illinois has shifted back
toward the common law.
In reality such a provision does not
violate the "double jeopardy" clause if
an analogy is drawn between double
jeopardy and res judicata and it is as-
sumed that the first jeopardy is not ended
until a trial free of all errors, on behalf
of either side, is had."i Justice Holmes,
in a dissenting opinion in Kepner v.
United States' said, "There is but one
continuing jeopardy from the beginning
to the end of the cause which is not lim-
ited by any 'rule that a man cannot be
tried twice in the same case'." In State v.
Lee"' it was argued that double jeopardy
should not bar appeals by the State since
logically and rationally there is but one
Inst. Code of Crim. Procedure-Official Draft
(1931), 1191-3; Miller, Appeals by the State in
Criminal Cases (1927), 36 Yale Law Journal 486.
14 People v. White, 364 Ill. 574, 5 N. E. (2d)
472 (1936).
"3 Ill. Const. (1870), Art. II, Sec. 10.
16 People v. Vitale, 364 Ill. 589, 5 N. E. (2d)
474 (1936).
17 In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937),
the Supreme Court of the United States said that
although Congress cannot pass an act allowing
the United States a general appeal, because of
the Fifth Amendment, many states can, and
that "due process" of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is not thereby affected or violated.
is 195 U. S. 100, 134 (1904).
19 65 Conn. 265 (1894).
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jeopardy and one cause and the second
trial after appeal by the State is not a
new case but is a legal disposition of the
same original case tried in the first in-
stance. And so the court there held. It
is suggested that the Illinois Supreme
Court might adopt this same theory and
when the problem is again raised it would
be well for the court to become more
liberal.20
We recommend that the legislature should
go the whole way and allow an "appeal"
by the State in all criminal cases. Double
jeopardy can be avoided on the theory
above expounded. If the decision of the
lower court is affirmed, no harm is done
and a better standard of justice will be
obtained; if it is reversed the defendant
is held by a tribunal generally better
qualified to determine the law applicable.
Without sufficient convictions, which fol-
lows from allowing no appeals, the effec-
tive administration of criminal law bogs
down. "Bad" law is created by improper
treatment of cases in trial courts and a
safeguard against the creation of "bad"
law is to allow an appeal so that the
supreme court may correct these mis-
takes: Criminal law has become a one
sided subject; in fact, it tends to become
"defense law" because defense errors can-
not be raised in appellate courts. Real-
izing that reversals come only through
defense initiative, the judge shows a
20 Note (1938), 27 Ill. Bar Journal 104, 106.
21 McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684 (1894).
tendency to lean toward the defendant.
In order to prevent reversal, the judge
sometimes grants about everything that
the defendant requests. He is apt to be-
come one-sided by excitement, newspaper
criticism, personal interest and prejudice,
etc. Of course, in other cases, honest
mistakes may be made and it is better
that such mistakes be corrected by a high
court than to turn criminals loose. If the
defendant may appeal, to which he has
no absolute constitutional right since one
hearing will satisfy "due process," 21 there
is no logical reason why the State should
not also have the full right of appeal.
One of the main arguments against the
right of appeal by the State is that the
avenging State could otherwise appeal
until the defendant was convicted.22
Justice Holmes has answered this argu-
ment saying, "there is more danger that
criminals will escape justice than that
they will be subjected to tyranny. '23
Another argument that has been offered
but which seemingly has little merit is
that there is psychological coercion of the
second jury to find a defendant guilty
because of the reversal by the upper
court. Because much new work and ad-
ministrative difficulties may arise is
hardly a valid argument for refusing an
appeal to be granted to the State.
DAVID WANDELL.
22 State v. Jones, 7 Ga. 422 (1849).
23Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100 (1904).
